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Abstract 
Most of Canada’s publicly-funded educational institutions have operated since 
the 1990s under blanket reprographic licences. But recent Copyright Act 
amendments and Supreme Court decisions in several copyright cases have 
added legislative and judicial weight to the idea that copyright encompasses both 
private owners’ rights and public users’ rights in the form of infringement 
exceptions such as fair dealing. Many educational institutions have responded to 
these changes by moving toward greater reliance on statutory users’ rights and 
direct licensing with copyright owners, and by moving away from blanket 
collective licensing. Not unexpectedly, copyright owners and the societies and 
collectives that represent them see the changes in copyright law in a different 
light. Copyright owners’ and educators’ variant conceptions of the kinds of 
educational copying that are compensable pose a challenging policy problem in 
need of a principled solution that upholds the legislative underpinnings of 
copyright law and is perceived to be fair. This article attempts to frame a 
balanced understanding of underlying issues by considering the nature and 
purpose of copyright, the purpose of copyright collectives, what is meant by fair 
dealing, and, ultimately, how we should think about copyright. It suggests that 
meaningful change may not be achievable without concerted attention paid to the 
language we use to think and talk about copyright in order to construct a combat-
free shared space in which learning, inquiry, and the production of creative works 
are fostered and, when appropriate, rewarded fairly. 
Keywords 
copyright; Canada. Copyright Act; fair dealing; educational institutions; copyright 
collectives 
Introduction 
A blanket licensing arrangement existed somewhat uneasily for about two 
decades between Canada’s publicly-funded educational institutions and Access 
Copyright, a collective society representing copyright owners of textual works 
across Canada outside of Quebec. Established in 1988 and known as 
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CANCOPY until 2002, Access Copyright negotiated its first educational blanket 
licence with the province of Ontario in 1991 for reprography of book and journal 
excerpts in K-12 schools, after which most of Canada’s other public K-12 and 
postsecondary institutions acquired a similar licence over the next several years 
(Copyright Board of Canada, Statement 14). But almost from the start, disquiet 
hovered around an issue on which the parties have generally agreed to disagree:  
the meaning and scope of the infringement exception called fair dealing in 
section 29 of the Copyright Act. 
Unease intensified over the past decade after infringement exceptions were 
recast as users’ rights by the Supreme Court of Canada in a unanimous 2004 
decision (CCH; par. 12). In its landmark CCH ruling, the Court confirmed the 
Copyright Act’s dual public and private objectives, which were described by the 
Court two years earlier in its Théberge decision as “a balance between promoting 
the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts 
and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator” (par. 30). The Théberge 
and CCH rulings together signal a need to recalibrate our conceptions of the 
interests served by copyright.  
This article considers the policy conundrum of how to approach that recalibration 
task with regard to educational copying, which is unfolding as a complex and, at 
times, divisive issue. Widely divergent interpretations of the Copyright Act and 
relevant case law have created an ideological chasm separating two groups:  
authors, publishers and other owners of copyright in original intellectual works on 
one side, and, on the other, members of the educational community who copy 
selections from those works for student use as part of the broad endeavour to 
cultivate an informed citizenry. The crux of the conundrum is disagreement on 
the bounds of compensable educational copying. 
If we assume that a thriving creative culture and a well-rounded educational 
system are both highly valuable and vitally important to the continued flourishing 
of our society, how might we effectively address competing interests of copyright 
owners who maintain that educational institutions need blanket licences to cover 
classroom copying, and educators who believe blanket licensing is unnecessary 
because the majority of their copying is covered by fair dealing and licence 
agreements negotiated directly with publishers? Four issues appear to be 
embroiled in this discord: What is copyright? What is the purpose of copyright? 
What is the purpose of copyright collectives? How is fair dealing understood?  
The answers explored here may inform policy development and refinement, but 
they also raise a further question: How should we think about copyright? This 
article proposes that resolution of our current quandary calls for shared 
commitment to converting the copyright “battlefield” into an enlivened, inclusive 
space conducive to a meeting of minds on fair and effective ways to encourage 
the pursuit of learning, inquiry, and the creative arts, and to ensure appropriate, 
fair rewards for creators. 
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What is Copyright? 
A key point of divergence across variant viewpoints on compensable educational 
copying is the issue of what copyright is believed to be. Factually, copyright is a 
type of statute-enabled intellectual property that subsists immediately upon the 
creation of anything deemed to be its proper subject matter existing in a fixed or 
perceptible form, and lasts for a limited term. During that term, which in Canada 
is normally the life of the creator plus 50 years, a set of sole rights to control 
reproduction and other specified acts is granted to the copyright owner who, in 
most cases, is initially the creator. Sections 3, 15, 18, and 21 of the Copyright Act 
delineate the subject matter of copyright in Canada: entire, or any substantial part 
of, works (literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic), performers’ performances, 
sound recordings, and communication signals, respectively.1  The latter three 
categories comprise “other subject-matter” under the Act that are elsewhere 
sometimes referred to as “neighbouring rights.”2   
While the plain definition of copyright may stir little controversy, sticking points 
surface quickly if we instead ask “What is the nature of the property possessed 
by a copyright owner?”  For some, “property” and “owner” in this context are 
imprecise terms for complex, contested constructs, but for others there is 
negligible meaningful difference between owning copyright in a work and owning 
a physical object such as a book, music CD, or car. The difficulty is that while the 
term “property” easily brings to mind possession and control of immediately-
perceived things, material property and intellectual property are distinct kinds of 
entities. Because the former is tangible but the latter is not, material and 
intellectual property are necessarily associated with qualitatively different owner 
rights as they are not controllable in the same ways.  
A work of the intellect may be an original expression of ideas, but the ideas 
themselves are never the subject of copyright. Thomas Jefferson insightfully 
compared ideas to exclusive physical property such as land and machines—both 
commonly conceived of as things that can belong to individuals—and concluded 
that property rights to ideas do not exist in nature: 
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress 
of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of 
an individual brain, could, of natural right be claimed in exclusive and 
stable property. If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all 
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an 
idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it 
to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession 
                                                          
1
 Copyright in a performer’s performance in WTO member countries is delineated in section 26 of 
the Act. 
2
 In addition to the economic rights called copyright, the Copyright Act grants moral rights which 
this article does not address. Moral rights for authors of works and for performers’ live and 
recorded performances are covered in sections 14.1 and 17.1 of the Act, respectively.  
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of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar 
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other 
possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives 
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at 
mine, receives light without darkening me . . . . Inventions, then cannot, in 
nature be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the 
profits arising from them, as an encouragement . . . to pursue ideas which 
may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will 
and convenience of the society. (333-34) 
Copyright thus subsists in original creations of the mind that differ from physical 
property in two important respects. First, since ideas, like air, are freely available 
to all and cannot be “locked up,” the proposition that particular expressions or 
arrangements of ideas are the subject of an individual’s natural rights and should 
be treated like exclusive property seems untenable. Second, the way in which 
such creations are used is nonrivalrous. Stories, songs, sculptures, and stage 
productions are enjoyable simultaneously and repeatedly by many individuals 
(copyright owners included) without being exhausted. Copyright-protected works 
of the intellect are, therefore, most usefully conceived of as property only in a 
metaphorical sense—analogous to, but also distinct from, material property—
given their basis in ideas, which are inexhaustible and inherently “incapable of 
confinement or exclusive appropriation” (Jefferson 334).  
The intangible nature of copyright as intellectual property usually implies a need 
for its subject matter to be fixed in a material form to enable use and protection, 
although this is not explicitly stated in the Canadian Copyright Act. The Act refers 
to “fixed” works in its definitions of computer program, dramatic work, and 
performer’s performance (s. 2), but leaves unaddressed other issues relating to 
fixation such as a work’s rightful author when its creator and initial fixer are not 
the same person. In contrast, U.S. copyright law includes a definition of “fixed” 
that connects fixation to authorization by the author: 
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment 
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A 
work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 
“fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made 
simultaneously with its transmission. (17 USC. Sec. 101)   
Examination of the meaning of “substantial part” in sections 3, 15, 18, and 21 of 
the Canadian statute raises further complications in defining copyright. The 
Supreme Court provided some elucidation in a 2013 decision: 
A substantial part of a work is a flexible notion. It is a matter of fact and 
degree . . . determined in relation to the originality of the work that 
warrants . . . protection . . . As a general proposition, a substantial part of a 
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work is a part of the work that represents a substantial portion of the 
author’s skill and judgment expressed therein. (Cinar; par. 26)   
Citing with approval a 1964 U.K. ruling that quality, not quantity, should  
determine whether a part is substantial, the Court noted the importance in such 
determinations of seeking an appropriate balance between “giving protection to 
the skill and judgment exercised by authors in the expression of their ideas . . . 
and leaving ideas and elements from the public domain free for all to draw upon” 
(Cinar; par. 28). The aspect of the “public domain” referenced here is not the 
familiar territory inhabited by works created prior to enactment of copyright law—
works whose copyright terms have expired and works designated as being 
unprotected by copyright. Instead, it points to the less recognized but “most 
important part of the public domain . . . comprising aspects of copyrighted works 
that copyright does not protect” (Litman 976). 
Another thorny concept enmeshed in copyright’s fabric is originality. Section 5 of 
the Copyright Act states copyright subsists in every “original” work subject to 
specified conditions. The meaning of “original” under the Act was one of the 
issues before the Supreme Court in CCH. The Court acknowledged two 
interpretive approaches known as “sweat of the brow” (requiring an original work 
simply to originate from an author and be more than a copy) and “creativity” 
(requiring a creative element in addition to authorial origination of more than a 
mere copy) but determined that the proper approach regards the expression of 
an idea to be original if it results from an exercise of skill and judgment (pars. 15-
16). In this moderate standard of originality, intellectual effort is required that 
goes beyond a trivial mechanical exercise, but the result need not be novel or 
unique. In Cinar the Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the children’s 
television show in question was an original work, noting “[t]he development of a 
group of characters that have specific personality traits and whose interactions 
hinge on those personalities can require an exercise of skill and judgment 
sufficient to satisfy the Copyright Act’s originality criterion” (par. 46). 
On the surface, then, the concept of copyright is intuitively understandable when 
encountered in the guise of common terms signifying directly perceived material 
objects. But a closer look reveals copyright to be a slippery, artificial construct 
riddled with metaphoric conceits and the opaque requirements that its subject 
matter be fixed, a substantial part, and original. The aspect of an intellectual work 
that copyright protects is its intangible original expression of ideas, but a work is 
ordinarily perceived, at least initially, only in a tangible or fixed form. Variant 
perspectives on what copyright is are thus often indicative of different positions 
taken on the overlapping issues of whether copyright is thought to be 
conceptually equivalent or only partially analogous to tangible exclusive property; 
a natural or an artificial, societally created right; and applicable to every particle 
of all works by a creator or only to works evidencing originality or substantial 
parts of such works. 
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What is the Purpose of Copyright? 
Copyright’s purpose is another contentious matter. Copyright is often presumed 
to serve the singular purpose of protecting authors’ and owners’ interests. 
Arguably, that is how Canadian copyright law reads as the majority of the 
Copyright Act’s 92 sections deal with owners’ rights, infringement remedies, and 
copyright administration. Comparatively less attention is paid to users’ rights 
(infringement exceptions), which are confined to four sections (ss. 29 to 32.2). As 
recently as 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed an author-centred view 
of copyright’s purpose, citing with approval an earlier U.K. decision that 
unequivocally declared the “single object” of the Copyright Act to be “the benefit 
of authors of all kinds” (Bishop, pars. 478-79). 
Ascertaining the purpose of a law can also be informed by considering contextual 
matters such as underlying legislative intents. The rationale articulated by 
Jefferson for society’s grant of a limited monopoly to inventors, “encouragement  
. . . to pursue ideas which may produce utility” (334), has echoes of the ends that 
motivated enactment of the world’s first copyright law, the 1710 U.K. Statute of 
Anne, whose formal title proclaims it to be “An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning.”  The purpose of copyright is laid out in the U.S. Constitution as the 
power vested in Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries" (Art. 1, Sec. 8). 
Canada’s current Copyright Act has lacked an explicit purpose statement from its 
enactment in 1921 as a close copy of the U.K. copyright law of 1911 (Vaver, 
Intellectual 55). But Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867 states a desire for the 
founding provinces “to be federally united into One Dominion . . . with a 
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom,” from which we can 
infer general alignment between Canada’s laws and the U.K.’s legislative 
foundations, which include the Statute of Anne. The intertwined roots of British, 
American and Canadian copyright law are thus grounded in a common desire to 
advance societally beneficial (public) ends through grant of time-limited exclusive 
(private) rights to creators. 
More recently, by reasserting the objective of the Copyright Act in Théberge and 
CCH to promote a balance of both private and public interests, the Supreme 
Court significantly clarified the purpose of copyright in Canada. Théberge 
provides an explicit articulation of why balance is an important purpose of the 
Act:   
Excessive control by holders of copyrights . . . may unduly limit the ability 
of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in 
the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles 
to proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions to copyright 
infringement enumerated in ss. 29 to 32.2, which seek to protect the public 
domain in traditional ways such as fair dealing. (par 32) 
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Furthermore, the preamble to the 2012 Copyright Modernization Act describes 
Canada’s Copyright Act as “an important marketplace framework law and cultural 
policy instrument that . . . supports creativity and innovation” and also “provide[s] 
. . . some limitations on rights . . . to further enhance users’ access to copyright 
works or other subject-matter.”  Undoubtedly, the purpose of copyright law in 
Canada today is equally to promote and protect the interests of both copyright 
owners and members of the public who wish to use copyright-protected material. 
On the whole, the historical purpose of copyright was to encourage the creation 
of societally useful works through a time-limited grant of a set of exclusive 
owners’ rights. Although owners’ rights, remedies, and rights administration 
dominate the text of copyright law, the Supreme Court has recently clarified the 
existence of two objectives of Canada’s copyright law that must be kept in 
balance:  the promotion of public access to works of the intellect, and the 
provision of economic rewards for creators. The tension inherent in these 
competing purposes has been characterized as an “interminable challenge . . . to 
construct a system that uses exclusivity to stimulate the creation and 
dissemination of works for the benefit of the public without unduly harming the 
public interest by restricting the ability to access and use the works that are thus 
created” (Craig, "Digital Locks" 507-08). 
What is the Purpose of Copyright Collectives? 
Concentrated efforts to modernize the 1921 Copyright Act did not come to fruition 
until 1988 when an initial set of reforms was passed that included “measures to 
improve the collective administration of copyright” (Canada. Canadian Heritage). 
Prior to the 1988 reforms, the two major active collectives were in the music 
industry (Wilkinson 333), and in Quebec the Union des écrivains québecois had 
performed some functions of a reprographic collective ("Copyright Collectives 
and Libraries"). Today, about thirty-four collectives act on behalf of Canadian 
rights holders across a range of creative communities that include musicians, 
recording producers, writers, performers, film directors, artists, and broadcasters 
(Copyright Board of Canada, "Copyright").  
The Copyright Act defines “collective society” as 
a society, association or corporation that carries on the business of 
collective administration of copyright or of the remuneration right conferred 
by section 19 or 81 for the benefit of those who, by assignment, grant of 
licence, appointment of it as their agent or otherwise, authorize it to act on 
their behalf in relation to that collective administration. (s. 2) 
Copyright owners and licensees can entrust collectives with management of their 
economic rights under the Act, which may involve handling inquiries from parties 
wishing to use copyrighted works in ways that require permission. Collectives are 
free to carry out their duties in a variety of ways that include blanket licensing of 
their entire repertoire of works and providing transactional licences for use of 
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specific works on an as-needed basis (Knopf 120). Under section 70.12 of the 
Act, a collective can stipulate the royalties, usage terms, and conditions in a 
licence in two ways:  file a proposed tariff with the Copyright Board, or negotiate 
agreements with users.  
The Copyright Board of Canada is a federal government-appointed economic 
tribunal established in 1989 as a successor to the Copyright Appeal Board 
(Annual Report). Section 66.7(1) of the Copyright Act provides that “[t]he Board 
has, with respect to  . . . matters necessary or proper for the due exercise of its 
jurisdiction, all powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a superior court.”  
The Board’s jurisdiction includes certification of tariffs and determination of 
royalties to be charged by collectives. A critical issue dividing copyright owners 
and educators that the Copyright Board to date has not deemed necessary to 
address is whether a tariff for educational institutions, once certified, becomes 
mandatory when a user makes any copyright-protected use of the repertoire 
covered by the tariff (Copyright Board of Canada, File: Access).  
Copyright collectives essentially serve to promote and manage owners’ economic 
rights under the Copyright Act. Their activities, which include issuing licences, 
filing tariffs for compensable uses, and distributing royalties, are performed under 
the general supervision of the Copyright Board. The primarily economic nature of 
their functions notwithstanding, since collectives and the Board are created and 
governed by the Act, it is reasonable to presume that the conduct of their 
activities should be consonant with both of the Act’s purposes, and not merely 
the one concerned with rewards for creators. 
How is Fair Dealing Understood? 
Embedded in the shift in judicial articulations of copyright’s purpose over the past 
two decades—from the singular objective of benefits for authors to the dual 
objectives, properly balanced, of promoting public access to intellectual and 
creative works and justly rewarding creators—is an evolving understanding of the 
meaning and scope of fair dealing. Under Part III of the Copyright Act, fair dealing 
is one of several infringement exceptions—infringement being any act 
permissible to a copyright owner that is instead performed by a person without 
the copyright owner’s consent or a defence (s. 27(1)). Prior to the CCH decision 
in 2004, infringement exceptions were generally treated as possible defences to 
allegations of infringement, not rights in themselves.  
In CCH, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the objective identified in Théberge of 
balancing the Copyright Act’s dual public and private goals. But the Court went 
much further by stating that the Act “sets out the rights and obligations of both 
copyright owners and users” (par. 11), by observing exceptions to be “perhaps 
more properly understood as users’ rights” (par. 12), and by explaining that “the 
fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an integral part of 
the Copyright Act than simply a defence. . . . In order to maintain the proper 
balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not 
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be interpreted restrictively” (par. 48). Importantly, CCH’s reframing of fair dealing 
as a users’ right, rather than a mere infringement defence or privilege, suggests a 
corresponding obligation on the part of copyright owners to facilitate users’ 
exercise of that right (Craig, "Digital Locks" 511; Chapdelaine 28-29). 
Given that the Copyright Act does not define “fair” and that fairness “depends on 
the facts of each case” (CCH; par. 52), how do we identify dealings that are fair? 
In the context of evaluating fairness of a dealing with a work, “fair” can be 
reasonably understood to mean “free from bias, fraud, or injustice; equitable; 
legitimate, valid, sound” ("Fair" def. 2)—in other words, balanced. The Supreme 
Court’s CCH ruling presents a flexible analytical framework of six factors (the 
purpose, character, amount and effect of a dealing; the nature of the work; and 
alternatives to the dealing) that could be helpful in assessing whether a dealing is 
fair. However, the factors relevant to a particular case are neither restricted to, 
nor are required to include, the six identified by the Court (par. 60). 
A further matter is whether fair dealing can be curtailed by copyright owners’ 
statutory right to license uses of their works, the administration of which is often 
delegated to copyright collectives. Here, too, the Supreme Court shed light in 
CCH on an issue contested by copyright owners and educators. The Court stated 
that fair dealing with a work is possible even when licensed access to the work is 
available for purchase: 
The availability of a licence is not relevant to deciding whether a dealing 
has been fair. . . . If a copyright owner were allowed to license people to 
use its work and then point to a person’s decision not to obtain a licence 
as proof that his or her dealings were not fair, this would extend the scope 
of the owner’s monopoly over the use of his or her work in a manner that 
would not be consistent with the Copyright Act’s balance between owner’s 
rights and user’s interests. (par. 30) 
Any thoughts that the Supreme Court’s views in CCH on fair dealing and users’ 
rights might be overlooked as “stray language” (Vaver, "User Rights" 106) should 
have been dispelled by the Court’s decisions in Alberta (Education) and SOCAN, 
which reiterated and reapplied the Court’s approach to fair dealing in CCH.  How, 
then, do authors and educational users now articulate their positions on collective 
licensing and fair dealing in light of the 2012 Copyright Act amendments, most of 
which came into force on November 7, 2012, and the Supreme Court’s 2012 
decisions involving fair dealing? An open exchange of letters in 2013 between 
The Writers’ Union of Canada (TWUC) and the University of British Columbia 
(UBC) reveals some answers (Heffron; Toope).  
In a letter to the President of UBC, TWUC chair Dorris Heffron expresses “great 
disappointment and frustration” at UBC’s announced course pack cost savings 
achieved through reliance on fair dealing. Her letter states the view that UBC’s 
fair dealing guidelines “are not supported by established law in Canada, nor are 
they likely ever to be.”  She claims that “partners in education” such as UBC are 
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damaging a laboriously-established “collective licensing architecture” of fair 
compensation to authors by achieving cost savings “on the backs of Canada’s 
writers.” The “grossly unfair” result is viewed as “expropriation of the property of 
some of Canada’s lowest paid professionals by some of Canada’s highest paid 
professionals.” 
TWUC’s position appears to be that UBC’s interpretation of the scope of fair 
dealing is incorrect and upsets an existing appropriate and fair collective 
licensing regime for compensating authors. Authors’ writings are portrayed as 
material possessions wrongfully taken from economically disadvantaged private 
owners by the economically advantaged for public use under UBC’s fair dealing 
guidelines. Even though Heffron’s letter focuses on perceived economic harms 
caused by the interpretation of fair dealing in the guidelines, it also refers to 
universities and writers as “partners in education,” which may indicate the 
existence of some common ground. 
UBC President Stephen Toope’s response to the TWUC letter notes that UBC 
uses fair dealing to make “learning materials available to students on the most 
cost-effective basis possible.”  His reply aims to “help [TWUC] to better 
understand” measures taken to “ensure that [UBC] is responding correctly to the 
balance that the Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada have struck in 
relation to the rights of both authors and users.”  His letter outlines how UBC 
pays $25 million annually to publishers and authors and includes course pack 
sales as a portion of UBC’s total spending on learning materials. “[T]rained staff” 
are said to use a “rigorous process” to clear permissions for course pack 
materials and to acquire needed licences. That “some publishers and authors 
have decided not to grant any transactional clearances” is noted. 
UBC’s position commits to operating within a balanced fair dealing framework 
created by legislators and the courts. The proportion of UBC’s learning materials 
expenditures represented by course pack sales is shown to be very small, and 
UBC’s careful approach to permissions clearance is explained. Toope’s stated 
desire to aid understanding suggests an interest in achieving common ground 
with TWUC members, although the noted inability to acquire some transactional 
licences perhaps hints at concerns about good faith dealings. 
In a 2013 statement expressing perspectives on fair dealing and collectives 
similar to those of TWUC, the Canadian Copyright Institute (CCI), an association 
of copyright owners and collectives, makes two notable assertions. The CCI 
begins by professing to be “open to reviewing and revising aspects of the 
licensing agreements, and negotiating new principles around fair dealing,” but 
later declares that “Canada’s copyright owners will support whatever action is 
needed to reinstate collective licensing in schools, colleges and universities” 
(Canadian Copyright Institute 2, 8). The dissonance between these two 
messages in effect puts the CCI’s true openness to collaborative review, revision, 
and negotiation into question. Aspects of the CCI statement that seem 
inconsistent with current copyright law and appear to disregard relevant facts 
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about works commonly used by educational institutions are discussed in an 
article by four members of the Canadian Library Association’s Copyright 
Committee (Glusko et al.). Their article also reveals the CCI’s Board to have very 
strong ties to Access Copyright.  
That Canadian copyright law underwent significant intentional changes in 2012 is 
incontrovertible. A pivotal matter of evident dissent between copyright owners 
and the educational community, however, is whether the “fair dealing consensus” 
(Geist) reflected in guidelines now in place across many educational institutions 
(e.g., Noel and Snel; Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada) 
represents an accurate interpretation of fair dealing’s ambit under the Copyright 
Act. But this bone of contention is not new:  from the very first model licence 
negotiated in 1994, the view held by the Association of Universities and Colleges 
of Canada that “single copies of the whole of a periodical article for private study  
. . . represent ‘fair dealing’” has never been shared by Access Copyright 
("Agreement Eases Copyright Woes").  
How Should We Think About Copyright? 
A porous conceptual basis and an “author-centric view” (SOCAN; par. 9) of 
copyright’s purpose provided tenuous grounds for the educational copying 
regime, founded in the 1990s on blanket licensing, that precariously encircled 
profound disagreement on the scope of fair dealing. The above sampling of 
current positions of copyright owners and educational community members 
bespeaks lingering, if not further entrenched, differences. At the same time, 
repeated Supreme Court interpretations of fair dealing as an essential users’ right 
and statutory inclusion of education as a fair dealing purpose create a window of 
opportunity for recalibrating conceptualizations of educational copying and 
related policy.  
Such an undertaking, however, raises the question of what principles should 
guide the process. William Fisher suggests that understanding the theoretical 
underpinnings of intellectual property is important because of the rapidly 
increasing prominence of intellectual property in cultural and business matters 
around the world. In his survey of philosophical, economic, political, and legal 
rationales for intellectual property, Fisher identifies four leading perspectives 
within the literature of intellectual property theory:  utilitarianism, labour theory, 
personality theory, and social planning theory. This section briefly considers the 
potential of each of these perspectives, the first two of which have been touched 
on implicitly thus far, to provide guiding principles for how we should think about 
copyright.  
Utilitarian Approaches 
Utilitarian approaches are guided by the principle of maximizing net benefits to 
society. This was the goal of the legislators who passed the 2012 Copyright Act 
amendments as a means of achieving “balanced copyright” (Canada. Industry 
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Canada and Canada. Canadian Heritage). While the stated dual purposes of 
fostering creativity and promoting access to works are laudable, determinations 
of societal benefits are often carried out as economic or marketplace-based 
assessments that tend to tilt the scales toward private owners’ rights, as they are 
the easiest to measure. Assigning measures to culture or to an educated 
citizenry is a more challenging task, and doing so risks reducing them to 
monetized or quantified commodities, producing an outcome of questionable 
benefit to society’s progress.  
Further, in a utilitarian model, the two purposes of copyright can appear to be in 
competition with each other (what provides the greatest net benefits to society— 
commercial success or a cultured citizenry?), which raises the question of 
whether balance is a true intent or merely convenient political rhetoric. A 
“greatest societal benefits” lens for rethinking copyright therefore seems 
inappropriate as it is the current approach taken by legislators with results that 
are apparently unsatisfactory, given current levels of discord between copyright 
owners and users regarding the nature and bounds of their respective rights and 
obligations.  
Labour Approaches 
Labour theory ascribes a natural property right to creators on the basis that works 
they expend effort to create from ideas freely available to all result in no harm to 
others or to society because the supply of ideas is not depleted. As noted above, 
however, intellectual property and ownership are metaphoric concepts that have 
become concretized and, for some, almost indistinguishable from their material 
world cousins. Given the force of Jefferson’s observation that property, 
intellectual or otherwise, does not exist in nature but is instead “the gift of social 
law” (333), adopting a lens for recalibrating thinking about copyright that 
deliberately keeps this inconvenient fact out of focus seems ill-advised.   
Since an author of an original work is automatically its copyright owner, what if, 
as a practical tactic, we simply agreed to treat copyright as more or less 
equivalent to material property? This approach is questionable, as it would be 
tantamount to erasing the realm of ideas as a public good perpetually held in 
common and enjoyable by all, and would implicitly encourage overreach of 
owners’ control over their works to the detriment of public access to those works. 
Such an outcome could reduce copyright owners’ economic rewards and would 
almost certainly hinder rather than enhance society’s progress. 
Personality Approaches 
Personality theory is a third theoretical perspective identified by Fisher in the 
intellectual property literature (189). It is based on the premise that intellectual 
property rights fulfill creators’ need for protection of their personhood captured in 
their works. This approach would likely be viewed favourably by authors and 
other creators as it accords strong weight to policies aimed at meeting their 
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needs for marketplace success or for environments conducive to creative 
productivity.  
Abundant creativity and economic competitiveness are certainly part of Canada’s 
“balanced copyright” agenda, but how personality theory approaches might 
address the other purpose of copyright—encouraging learning through public 
access to creative works—is unclear. Personality theory as a theoretical lens 
seems insufficient for our recalibration task as it yields principles for policy 
creation that address only one of copyright’s two purposes for which we seek a 
workable balance. 
Social Planning Approaches 
Social planning theory is Fisher’s label for theoretical approaches that regard 
intellectual property rights as components of a desirable, fair society (192). These 
approaches typically combine different theories and principles to craft policies 
aimed at cultivating such a society. In Fisher’s view, social planning theory has 
the greatest limitations of the four approaches. The chief reason is the seemingly 
insuperable challenge of envisioning a fair society involving intellectual property 
rights that are acceptable to most citizens, given that ideas on what is fair or just 
have long fueled intellectual debate with no resolution in sight. Nevertheless, 
social planning theory perhaps holds the most promise as a useful lens for 
rethinking copyright with an eye to evaluating the “collective licensing or fair 
dealing” dichotomy associated with educational copying.  
Advantages of social planning approaches include the freedom to select 
principles and theories to frame issue-specific policies (e.g., one for maximizing 
creativity and innovation, another for enlarging public access to creative works) 
and flexibility in making adjustments over time to policies that may call for 
different theoretical constructs or principles. Disadvantages include Fisher’s 
above-noted concern regarding the feasibility of defining and achieving 
consensus on what a desirable society looks like, as well as potential 
incoherence of the overall endeavour if too many disparate theories and 
principles are employed. 
Policies for a Desirable Society 
With the potential downsides of a social planning approach borne in mind, some 
desirable society-oriented ideas for bridging the chasm between creators and 
educators on the issue of compensable educational copying are sketched here. 
These ideas are premised on the assumption that the riches of a desirable 
society include vibrant creator communities and educational systems that 
stimulate the progress of human society through creativity, learning, and 
scholarship, and that individuals are typically both creators and users of 
copyrighted works.  
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How should a balance be struck between fair dealing and blanket licensing in the 
educational sphere? The necessary starting point is the law. As “balance” is not 
referenced in the Copyright Act, however, the balancing instruments provided in 
the Act can be considered in lieu, the most important of which are probably the 
exceptions to infringement. The Supreme Court’s observation in Théberge (par. 
31) that “[t]he proper balance among . . . public policy objectives lies not only in 
recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature” 
casts new light on limits to creators’ rights that allows us to view the function of 
the exceptions under the Act not only as limitations to infringement but also as 
limitations to copyright. Or, put differently, “the boundaries and limitations of the 
copyright interest are not external to copyright policy; they are a central part of 
how the system works” (Craig, "Digital Locks" 508). 
Fair dealing is likely the most important statutory exception relating to educational 
copying. In CCH, the Supreme Court elaborated on its holding in Théberge that 
the Copyright Act is a balance between private and public interests by stating that 
fair dealing purposes such as “[r]esearch must be given a large and liberal 
interpretation in order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained” 
(par. 70). Through these decisions, the Court enriched but also complicated the 
concept of fair dealing by invigorating it with a new central role in copyright’s 
balancing act. Furthermore, in Alberta (Education) (par. 21), the Court’s 
application of the CCH-mandated large and liberal interpretation yielded the 
important determination that in a classroom setting, fairness of the purpose of 
copying is properly assessed from the perspective of the end-user rather than the 
copier.  
The Copyright Act’s dual purposes must be given equal weight, otherwise 
fairness to creators and users, or balance, is not achieved. The provisions of the 
Act, combined with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Act in Théberge, 
CCH, and Alberta (Education), form a principled foundation on which to build 
policy that aims to balance legitimate interests of creators and educational users. 
Institutions like UBC have recently realigned their approach to educational 
copying with the statutory framework created by Parliament and interpreted by 
the courts. While fair dealing guidelines of such institutions may require 
adjustments, they result from a reasoned approach that strives for balance by 
respecting copyright owners’ rights, exercising users’ rights under the Act, and 
applying case law teachings.    
If fair dealing is an appropriate instrument of policy recalibration for educational 
copying, what is the role of collective licensing? In this author’s view, it can be a 
useful instrument as well. A prerequisite, though, is copyright owners’ acceptance 
of the Alberta (Education) decision as an indication that the 1990s-initiated 
licensing regime rested on an overly narrow view of fair dealing that cannot 
support the Copyright Act’s dual private and public purposes. Creators and users 
alike will be well-served if copyright owners, collectives, and educational 
institutions can collaboratively establish new licensing services of value to the 
institutions. A collective whose services may serve as a guide is the U.S.-based 
Partnership: the Canadian Journal of Library and Information Practice and Research, vol. 9, no. 2 (2014) 
15 
Copyright Clearance Center (CCC). That Canadian educational institutions 
operating without a blanket licence can sometimes secure a CCC licence to copy 
amounts of a Canadian publication beyond fair dealing when such a licence is 
not available to them from Access Copyright is no small irony. 
And what about the effects on authors of the recently-updated fair dealing 
guidelines now followed by many educational institutions? Although publishers, 
rather than authors, are often the copyright owners of published works 
(e.g.,Gasaway; Ewing), this is nonetheless a concern worth addressing, given 
that a desirable, fair society includes both authors and students. A first step could 
be to conduct an objective, nonpartisan analysis of the aspects of copyright 
owners’ and educational institutions’ rights, needs, and concerns that are 
implicated in the purposes and provisions of the Copyright Act, and those that are 
not. One such probable intersection between the rights, needs, and concerns of 
educators and copyright owners under the Act involves the compensable parts of 
educational copying that lie beyond properly-assessed fair dealing and outside of 
direct publisher licensing. Here exists an obvious potential role for collectives. 
The case may be, however, that some, if not most, of the concerns stemming 
from authors’ reduced royalties represent issues outside of the provisions and 
properly-heeded dual purposes of the Copyright Act. As Jessica Litman notes, 
many important societal concerns and goals are beyond what copyright law can 
possibly address: 
Copyright law has a narrow focus. It has never paid attention to a whole 
host of important interests that have traditionally informed our information 
policy, and copyright analysis turns out to have very little room in it to do 
so. In addition to free speech concerns, information policy takes account 
of issues related to equity, competition, ensuring a diversity of viewpoints, 
securing ready and affordable access to important sources of information 
privacy—all issues that are at best tangential to copyright law and in some 
cases wholly alien. (qtd. in Craig, "Digital Locks" 513) 
If much of the copying by educational institutions under former blanket licences is 
now properly assessed as fair dealing under the Act, then the place to address 
authors’ concerns about the corresponding reduction in royalties may lie outside 
of the Act. That is, while “[t]aking the public interest seriously means 
acknowledging that there will be occasions when protecting the socially useful 
results of an individual's efforts does not serve the interests of the public, and 
that on such occasions copyright protection should be denied" (Craig, Copyright 
121), denying copyright protection in such cases does not necessarily mean the 
concerns of affected authors should be ignored. 
A second step to examine authors’ concerns could broaden the evidence base by 
investigating whether there is a public interest in establishing a new program 
unconnected with copyright to compensate authors for societally beneficial uses 
of their works. If such a step is taken, rigorous, openly-shared research could be 
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conducted to develop balanced, principled grounds for determining suitable 
compensation levels that perhaps differentiate, among other things, between 
authors for whom publishing is a requirement of their academic or research 
positions and other authors for whom royalties represent a primary source of 
income. 
Conclusion 
Education as a new statutory fair dealing purpose, the Supreme Court’s 
insistence that fair dealing is essential for promotion of the public interest in the 
Canadian copyright scheme, and the Court’s ruling that fair dealing can cover 
copying of short excerpts for classroom use together signal that we have turned a 
new corner in the arena of educational copying and within the ever-evolving 
copyright terrain in general. We now need policy approaches that not only 
embrace the changes in statutory and case law that recognize users’ rights as an 
integral part of copyright’s balance but also give fair hearing to concerns about 
imbalances caused by those changes and commit to finding workable solutions 
where warranted. Failure to do both will belie the claim that our ultimate goal is to 
establish policies that promote a desirable, inclusive society.   
Successful recalibration of how we think about copyright is as dependent on 
mindfully-chosen language as it is on sound policy aimed at planning and 
sustaining a better society. Today’s debates about copyright are rife with 
adversarial, doom-ridden metaphors involving battles, fights, wars, and piracy.3  
We might excuse such metaphors as merely reflecting passionately-held 
positions on inherently controversial issues, but George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson propose that metaphors are not only pervasive features of language, 
they also structure how we think and act. Using as an example the conceptual 
metaphor “argument is war,” they point out: 
[W]e don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win 
or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an 
opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and 
lose ground. . . . Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal 
battle, and the structure of an argument—attack, defense, counterattack, 
etc.—reflects this. It is in this sense that the Argument is War metaphor is 
one that we live by in this culture. (Lakoff and Johnson 5) 
                                                          
3
 Consider, for example, the titles of these books on copyright published within the past several 
years: William R. Bobbitt, Universities, Faculty, and the Battle over Intellectual Property: Who 
Owns What's inside the Professor's Head? Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006; Adrian 
Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates, Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009; William F. Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009; Robert Levine, Free Ride: How Digital Parasites Are Destroying the 
Culture Business, and How the Culture Business Can Fight Back, New York: Doubleday, 2011; 
and Blayne Haggart, Copyfight: The Global Politics of Digital Copyright Reform, Toronto, ON: 
University of Toronto Press, 2014. 
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Rethinking our copyright conceptions calls for new metaphors aligned with the 
desirable, fair, and inclusive society we aspire to cultivate through balanced 
policy. Lakoff and Johnson invite us to “[i]magine a culture where an argument is 
viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers, and the goal is to 
perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way” (6). We need a new 
conceptual space for copyright that is conducive to a true meeting of willing 
minds where fresh starts and new partnerships can emerge. Taking Lakoff and 
Johnson’s lead, maybe we can work toward converting the current copyright 
battlefield into a ballroom, in which case the first question to be asked is, “Shall 
we dance?” 
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